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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. Case Number: 20 I 604 77-CA 
PRESTON MICHAEL 
COWLlSHAW 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Appeal from a conviction for kidnapping, a second degree felony, failure to 
respond at the command of police, a third degree felony and theft, a second degree 
felony in the Second District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable, Ernie W.Jones, 
Judge, presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence where no witness 
identified Mr. Cowlishaw as the perpetrator or as the person who stole the 
vehicle. 
a. Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of 
the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 
'against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach [] 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."' State v. 
1 
Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ,r 10, 197 P.3d 628 (quoting State v. Gordon, 2004 
UT 2, ,r 5, 84 P.3d 1167 (quoting State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 
786-87 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987)))). 
b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. Cowlishaw argued that there was 
insufficient evidence due to the State's failure to identify him. R. 
111-12. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The texts of the relevant Constitutional provisions and statutes are m 
Addendum A and B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged Mr. Cowlishaw onJune 26, 2015. R. 1-2. On April 14, 
2016, the case was tried to the court, who convicted Mr. Cowlishaw that same 
date. R. 188-331. On May 25, 2016, the court sentenced Mr. Cowlishaw to 
prison. R. 119-28. Mr. Cowlishaw timely appealed the conviction to this court on 
June 8, 2016. R. 139-40. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 24, 2015, Officer Joel Green received a call of a domestic 
disturbance occurring at a toll booth in Ogden, Utah involving a grey vehicle. R. 
196. He showed up on the scene, observed a grey vehicle and flipped a U-tum to 
get behind it. R. 198. The car stopped briefly and then took off at a high rate of 
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speed. R. 198-99. The officer pursued, activating his lights. R. 198-99. The officer 
lost the car at one point, then decided to check a field with tire tracks in it. R. 201. 
As he ran through the field, he heard a woman screaming for help down an 
embankment. R. 201-03. He looked down and saw the vehicle "wedged between 
the scrub oak and brush." R. 203-04. When the officer approached her, she said 
that "he wouldn't let her go" and that he had been holding her "all night, all day." 
R. 201. Officer Green, however, had no idea how many people were in the vehicle 
or who was the driver. R. 213. 
Officers brought in canine units and set up a perimeter, but were 
unsuccessful in finding the driver. R. 207. They interviewed the woman, Rachel 
Jones, who told them she had been kidnapped by a person named Preston. R. 213, 
226. She could not remember his last name. R. 214, 226. Deputy Michael 
Aschinger interviewed Jones, who showed him a text message saying, "Help, I 
have been kidnapped." R. 223. He also saw a text that said, "If you are interested 
in making some more$$ tonight, call me quick." R. 225. Jones had warrants for 
her arrest for drug possession and was taken into custody. R. 225, 272. Aschinger 
also observed that the car in the embankment was a "silver Nissan hatchback." R. 
223. 
Safwan Saad testified that his car, a sky blue 2010 Nissan Versa, was taken 
from his work when he left it briefly to run inside the office. R. 229-31. He did not 
see who took it, but when it was recovered, he did not recognize any of the items 
in it, which included garbage and food items. R. 234-36. 
3 
Sharon Leinweber testified that she was working at a toll booth when a 
silver car pulled up. R. 241. A girl jumped out and ran toward the office 
screaming, and video of this encounter was shown to the court. R. 241, State's Ex. 
31 and 32. Leinweber asked the driver, a "white Caucasian with a baseball cap" 
what was going on. R. 242. He responded that the girl was drunk and that he 
would be back. R. 242. He backed up the car and followed the girl. R. 242-45. 
Leinweber called 911 and believed, but did not see, that the girl got back into the 
car. R. 247-48. 
Rachel Jones testified that she met "Preston" once or twice before at her 
parents' home. R. 251. On the date of this incident, she said that he asked her if 
she wanted to get some food. R. 253. The two of them picked up food at Burger 
King in Salt Lake City and after, he continued to drive north past her house, 
saying he wanted to "get to know me more." R. 253. 
As the two passed Lagoon, he asked for Jones's phone. R. 254. He then 
took it from her and removed its battery, saying it was a distraction. R. 254. He 
drove crazily and fast, which scaredJones. R. 255. She asked him to stop to swim 
or bowl but he did not do it. R. 255-56. They eventually stopped at a church near 
an elementary school and after he made her remove her shoes, he allowed her to 
use her phone. R. 256-5 7. She called her mother and when she said she wanted to 
go home, he again took the phone from her. R. 25 7. 
He became sincere and told Jones he would take her home if she got back 
in the car. R. 258. She got back in. R. 258. As they continued to drive, she thought 
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he said ''crazy things" and alternated emotions from calm to anger. R. 259. They 
stopped another time at a gas station/ restaurant. R. 260. 
Eventually, they pulled up to a toll booth. R. 261. When they stopped, 
Jones testified she jumped out of the car. R. 262. She ran toward the office 
screaming for help and when no one was there, she turned and ran up the hill, 
eventually collapsing. R. 262. He came back and told her to get in. R. 262. She 
agreed. R. 262. 
When the police got behind them, he said that "[t]his can't happen" and 
sped off, running a red light. R. 263. He crashed into a tree and then tried to pull 
her out of the car. R. 263. Because his door was pinned, he climbed over Jones 
and took off. R. 264. She was in the car with him approximately six hours. R. 259. 
Officer Green told his superiors that he worried his case was not too strong. 
R. 210. Particularly, he was worried about the victim's willingness to cooperate. R. 
210. Consequently, he obtained a Burger King cup from the vehicle after Jones 
told him Preston had been drinking from it. R. 211. Fingerprint analysis of the cup 
and of prints obtained from the driver's side window came back to Mr. Cowlishaw. 
R. 287-89. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State failed to present sufficient evidence of all three offenses. No 
witness identified Mr. Cowlishaw as the person who kidnapped Jones or who was 
driving and failed to respond to the police. While Jones mentioned a "Preston," at 
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no point did she say Mr. Cowlishaw was that person. Police never observed or 
apprehended the driver. Nor did any of the State's evidence establish that Mr. 
Cowlishaw took the vehicle or that the vehicle recovered was even the vehicle 
taken from Saad. No witness observed the theft and no witness testified that :Mr. 
Cowlishaw illegally took possession of it. Additionally, no physical evidence linked 
Mr. Cowlishaw to the crime enough to say that he was the person who committed 
any of these offenses. The trial court erred in denying the motion for directed 
verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court erroneously denied the motion 
for directed verdict given that no witness 
identified Mr. Cowlishaw as the driver of the 
vehicle or as the person who conun.itted the 
crime, nor did they identify the car stolen as 
the sam.e car recovered. 
During trial, no witness specifically identified Mr. Cowlishaw as the person 
who kidnapped Jones, who failed to respond to police or who stole a motor 
vehicle. Nor did the State ever identify Saad's stolen vehicle as the same one police 
recovered.Jones was asked one question: ''When did you see--and the defendant 
is in the courtroom today; is that correct? A. Yes." R. 252. But at no point did she 
say that the person who sat in the courtroom was the person who committed this 
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offense. Jones herself only referred to a "Preston'' once and she made no other 
statements of identification. R. 25 7 .1 
Defense counsel pointed this out to the court. "No one actually identified 
[M:r. Cowlishaw] today," he said. R. 298. Jones never pointed him out. R. 298. 
Nor did the toll booth operator identify him. R. 298. As Mr. Cowlishaw argued to 
the court, " [ n] either [witness] was asked specifically if this individual sitting here is 
the individual involved in this case." R. 298. 
The evidence did not remedy the identification problem. Deputy Green 
testified it was too dark for him to see the driver, Deputy Aschinger did not see the 
driver, nor did Mr. Saad see who took his vehicle. R. 213, 234, 298.Jones never 
stated "Preston's" last name, either to the police or in court. R. 299. As for the 
fingerprints, even that evidence was not conclusive. R. 299. 
The State agreed it failed to formally identify Mr. Cowlishaw. But it 
contended that Jones "mentioned him as Preston several times" and "nodded 
towards" him such that formal identification was "not necessary." R. 302-03. It 
also argued that it did not need to formally identify him because fingerprint 
evidence put him in the vehicle. R. 303. 
The court rejected the identification argument. It agreed that• Mr. Saad 
"never identified the car that we see in the photographs 15, 16, and 17 as being his 
car." R. 305. But the court found that circumstantially, because Mr. Saad came up 
1 The State also asked her, "did you know the defendant, Preston Cowlishaw?" to 
which she replied "I had met him shortly once or twice, maybe three times." R. 
251. 
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and looked at a car which was "completely totaled" which was "consistent with the 
condition of the car" in the photographs, the two cars were the same. R. 305-06. 
The court also believed there was no question "that the defendant was the 
one involved in the theft of this motor vehicle based on the location of the 
fingerprints." R. 306. 
As for his identification, the court found that while Jones "may not have 
come out and made an identification" she said the man driving was "Preston." R. 
306. "[I]t just so happens that the defendant's first name is Preston. So while she 
may not have pointed to him and made a formal identification in court, I think 
when you couple the fingerprints and both of them being in the car, and him 
having the name Preston, I think that's enough to establish the identification." R. 
306. 
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIBNT EVIDENCE THAT MR. COWLISHAW 
WAS THE PERSON WHO KIDNAPPED JONES OR FAILED TO 
RESPOND TO POLICE WHEN NO WITNESS IDENTIFIED HIM AS 
THAT PERSON. 
The State never established that the person sitting at the defense tabl~ 
Preston Cowlishaw--was the person who kidnapped Jones or who avoided the 
police. Jones only stated that she believed the person's name was Preston-she 
never testified that his name was Preston Cowlishaw. Additionally, she never took 
the simple step of pointing out the person in the courtroom. State v. Harringt.on, 
2002-Ohio-2190, 1 12, 2002 WL 987836 (finding insufficient evidence where 
witness failed to make an in-court identification). While she agreed that the 
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"defendant" was in the courtroom, she did not indicate whether the defendant was 
Mr. Cowlishaw. These were critical errors that created an insufficient 
identification and ultimately amounted to insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction. 
"'A conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand."' 
Stat,e v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, iJ 14, 210 P.3d 288. Further, "a defendant need not 
adduce any evidence in his defense unless the prosecution first adduces believable 
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521,524 
(Utah 1983). A "motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the 
State's case in chief requires the trial court to determine whether the defendant 
must proceed with ... his defense." Stat,e v. Noren, 74 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). "When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient 
evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him 
discharged." Utah Code Ann.§ 77-17-3; see Utah R. Crim. P. l 7(p). 
This court will hold that there was insufficient evidence if "after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted." Stat,e v. Ho!gat,e, 2000 UT 
74, iJ 18, 10 P.3d 346 (quoting Stare v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). 
The State argued that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish 
Mr. Cowlishaw's identity and the court agreed. The court focused on two facts: 
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Jones' indication that the person was named Preston and fingerprints in the car 
belonged to Mr. Cowlishaw. The two facts, taken together, the court said were 
sufficient to establish his identity. R. 306. 
1. A person's na.IIle as ''Preston" was not a 
sufficient basis to identify Mr. Cowlishaw 
However, at no point, pre-trial or otherwise, did Jones identify Mr. 
Cowlishaw. The police did not do an in-person or a photo lineup. They did not 
have her point to a person in court. "An uncertain or equivocal identification, 
standing alone, is insufficient evidence to support a conviction." Gibson v. Stat,e, No. 
01-92-00127-CR, 1993 WL 55192, at *2 (Tex. App. Mar. 4, 1993). Here, there 
was no identification at all. 
The fact thatJones agreed with the prosecutor's question that the defendant 
was in the courtroom does not solve the problem. Jones could have picked 
someone else (not Mr. Cowlishaw) in the courtroom as the person in the vehicle, 
believing that person was the defendant. See Jones v. State, 1985 OK CR 14, 695 
P.2d 13, 16 (insufficient evidence as to identity where witness identified defendant's 
brother, who was in the courtroom, as the perpetrator). Or she could have been 
agreeing that the defendant was present, but not agreeing that the defendant was 
the person who committed the crime. 
The fact that the perpetrator was named Preston establishes nothing in 
terms of identity. The social security index reveals that for the year of Mr. 
Cowlishaw's birth alone--1989-Preston was the 73rd most popular male baby 
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name in the State of Utah, having received 62 registrations.2 The name of Preston 
was too probable and insufficiently unique to positively identify Mr. Cowlishaw. 
Notably, Jones did not know "Preston's" last name and while there was some 
testimony that an officer received a last name from Jones's stepfather, the 
stepfather never testified, nor did the officer state the last name. R. 226. 
No other witness identified Mr. Cowlishaw. The State never asked the toll 
booth operator if Mr. Cowlishaw was the person she spoke with. Neither police 
officer interacted with the driver or observed him. 
2. Fingerprint evidence did not establish that 
Mr. Cowlishaw committed the crime or was 
even present at that tim.e. 
Additionally, the fingerprint evidence does not establish that Mr. 
Cowlishaw was the person who committed these offenses. First, as defense counsel 
argued to the court, fingerprint evidence has come into large disrepute. The 
National Academy of Sciences, the most illustrious scientific body in the nation, 
having conducted an exhaustive and unprecedented examination of latent 
fingerprint analysis, concluded that fingerprint examiners "have yet to establish 
either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions ... "3 In 
2 https:/ /ww,v.ssa.gov/cgi-bin/narncsbvstatc.cgi (search "Preston" in "1989" for 
the State of Utah). 
3 Strengthening Forensic Science in the United Stat.es: A Path Fonvard (The National 
Academies Press, 2009), 53, 
http:/ /www.nap.edu/ openbook.php?record_id= 12589; see also ibid., 102 ("Over 
the years the courts have admitted fingerprint evidence, even though this evidence 
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reaching these conclusions, the NAS examined the standard methodology 
employed by fingerprint examiners and found that it provides "only a broadly 
stated framework for conducting [fingerprint] analyses," that "is not specific 
enough to qualify as a validated method."-! The NAS concluded that there is no 
"available scientific evidence of the validity of [the fingerprint analysis] method."5 
Accordingly, the NAS, in no uncertain terms, concluded that fingerprint 
examiners are "unjustified" in claiming the ability to match a latent fingerprint to 
a particular finger to the exclusion of all others in the world. 6 
The state and federal courts of this nation have a long history of treating the 
reports of the NAS as "authoritative works for purposes of determining generally 
accepted standards within the scientific community." Com. v. Gqynor, 820 N.E.2d 
233, 250 (Mass. 2005); United Stat.es v. Morrow, 374 F. Supp.2d 42, 49 (D.D.C. 
2005). In light of the impartiality and expertise that are the hallmarks of the NAS, 
courts, including Utah courts, have uniformly recognized that the conclusions of 
the NAS regarding the scientific validity of a particular methodology are 
"authoritative. "7 
has made its way into the courtroom without empirical validation of the 
underlying theory and/or its particular application."). 
4 Strengthening Forensic Science, 142. 
5 Ibid., 143. 
6 Ibid., 142; see also ibid., 7 (recognizing that fingerprint analysis has not been 
"shown to have the capacity of consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, 
demonstrat[ing] a connection between evidence [i.e, a latent print] and a specific 
individual or source."). 
7 See, e.g., Unit,ed St,a,t,es v. LJJwe, 954 F.Supp. 401, 403 (D. Mass. 1996) ("both the 
government and the defendant agree [the NRC report] is an authoritative work in 
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In United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003) the court noted that 
with respect to forensic fingerprint examination, there have "not been any studies 
to establish how likely it is that partial prints taken from a crime scene will be a 
match for only one set of finger prints in the world." Crisp, 324 F.3d at 273. "v\tnile 
fingerprint examiners have long claimed the mantle of science so as to bolster the 
credibility of their profession, the reality is that the fingerprint community has 
never conducted any scientific testing to validate the premises upon which the field 
is based. ''8 As one scholar noted, fingerprint science ultimately comes down to the 
subjective interpretation of an examiner, but not to any solidified science: 
"[W] here a method depends as heavily on subjective human judgment as does 
the field"); State v. BuUerfieM, 27 P.3d 1133, 1142 (Utah 2001) (describing NRC 
report as "authoritative"); Commonwealth v. Rosier, 685 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 1997) 
(describing NRC report as "an authoritative scientific study"); Peopl.e v. Allen, 72 
Cal.App.4th 1093, ll00 (Cal. App. 1999) (describing NRC report as "an 
authoritative scientific study"); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 327 (Mo. 1996) 
(describing NRC report as "authoritative"); Commonwealtlz v. B[y, 862 N.E.2d 341, 
355 (Mass. 2007) (describing NRC report as "authoritative"); Peopl.e v. Wilson, 136 
P.3d 864, 868 n. l (Cal. 2006) (describing NRC report as "authoritative"); see also 
United States v. Dams, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658, 663 n.4 (D. Md. 2009) (noting that NRC 
report on DNA is "widely regarded as one of the definitive publications on the use 
of DNA evidence in the field of forensics"); United Stat,es v. Trala, 162 F. Supp. 2d 
336, 351 (D. Del. 2001) ("Both the government and the defendant agree that the 
NRC [report] is widely regarded as one of the definitive publications on the use of 
DNA evidence in the field of forensics."); Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 
12, 15 (D. Mass. 1995) ("The most authoritative assessments of the health effects 
on humans of ionizing radiation are the periodic reports issued by the National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences .... "). 
8 Robert Epstein, "Fmgerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint Science Is 
Revealed," S. Cal L Rev. 75 (2001): 622,636. 
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fingerprint examination-the method literally is the people who employ it."9 To 
make matters worse, the fingerprint examiners' efforts "to create an error-free aura 
around fingerprint identification ... ha[ve] the potential to dangerously mislead 
finders of fact. "10 
Latent prints typically suffer from a considerable degree of smudging, 
blurring, and distortion because "[c]rime scene prints are unintentional, chance 
prints for which there is no thought {or desire) to produce a clear reproduction."11 
The distortions in latent prints stem from a number of sources: { 1) the surface upon 
which the print is deposited can affect the quality of the print either because it is 
less receptive to the deposit of a print in the first place,12 or because it makes the 
9 Jonathan]. Koehler, "Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They 
Are and Why They Matter," Hastings Law Journal 59 {2008 2007): 1090 (footnotes 
omitted). 
10 Simon A. Cole, "More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint 
Identification," Tu Journal of Criminal Law and Criminolno (1973-) 95, no. 3 (2005): 
991. 
11 John P. Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint' Defense," Prosecutor 39 
(December 2005): 34; Andre A. Moenssens, Scimtifi,c Evidence in Ci:oil and Criminal 
Cases (Foundation Press, 1995), 514 .. 
12 David R Ashbaugh, Qy.antitati.ve-Q,ualitati:oe Friction Ri,dge Ana!,sis: An Introduction to 
Basic and Advanced Ri,dgeowo (Boca Raton, Fla.: CRC Press, 1999), 124 ("various 
substrates [swfaces] can cause distortion or interfere with the deposition of a print, 
affecting its appearance and quality."); Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint' 
Defense," 34 ("Objects that are extremely porous or are made using course fibers 
prove to be poor receiving surfaces."); G. A. Fine, "A Review of the FBI's 
Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," Washington, DC: US Department of Justice 
Ojfice of the Inspector General, 2006, 103 ("One factor affecting the clarity of a latent 
fingerprint is the surface or "substrate: upon which a latent fingerprint is 
deposited."). 
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transfer of a print by law enforcement more complicated;13 (2) the shape of the 
ridges can be distorted or blurred by the amount of pressure used to deposit the 
print;14 (3) movement of the finger while the print was deposited can distort the 
print, as "movement of the finger by a distance equal to the width of one furrow 
between ridges ( 1 to 2/ l 00ths of an inch) is sufficient to blur a print beyond use; 15 
(4) overlapping or "double tap" prints can "obscure details in each print;16 (5) 
prints can be compromised by materials that are either on the surface where the 
print has been deposited, or on the finger or thumb of thumb itself; 17 and (6) 
13 Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint' Defense," 34 ("If the surface is uneven, 
only partial transfer will result leaving a print that is of no real value for 
identification. If the surface is rough, fingerprint powder may become trapped in 
the recesses causing such a loss of contrast as to obscure latent impressions."). 
14 Ibid. ("Because blurring due to rotational, lateral or longitudinal movement, 
deformation of the finger as it presses firmly against a surface typically causes some 
distortion and edge blurring."); Ashbaugh, Qyanti.tatwe-QJµzlitat:ive Friction Rulge 
Ana!Jsis, 123 (''Deposition pressure generally changes the shape of the friction ridge 
by flattening or broadening each ridge."). 
15 Nielson, ''Rebutting the 'No Fingexprint' Defense," 34 (citing problem of 
"fingexprints deposited while the surface or hand was moving causing slippage and 
resulting in only partial clarity"); Ashbaugh, Q_uanti.tatwe-QJµzlitat:ive Friction Rulge 
Ana!Jsis, 125 ("pressure distortion takes place on the lateral or horizontal place 
[ and] is usually accompanied by sideways sliding of the friction ridges resulting in a 
smearing or ridge matrix."). 
16 Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint' Defense," 34; Ashbaugh, Qyantitative-
Qy.alitat:ive Friction Ridge Ana!Jsis, 114; Fine, "A Review of the FBI's Handling of the 
Brandon Mayfield Case," 103. 
17 Ashbaugh, Q,uantitative-QJµzlitat:ive Friction Rul.ge Ana!Jsis, 116 ("Dirty surstrates 
[surfaces] may not accept all of the matrix [substance deposited by the fingertip] 
available during deposition. The resulting print can appear blotchy, have areas 
missing, or generally lack details."); Nielson, "Rebutting the 'No Fingerprint' 
Defense," 36 ("Depositing surface interferences include any contaminant on the 
friction ridges that hinders or prevents the deposit of fingerprint residue. For 
instance, dirt, grease and other foreign matter can obliterate the fine detail that 
must be present to effect an identification."). 
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fingerprints are developed and transferred by a variety of methods, all of which 
have the potential to cause distortions. 18 "Because of these factors, latent 
fmgerprints are not perfect reproductions of the friction skin, even over a small 
area.'' 19 
Traditionally, examiners when comparing prints have looked for "ridge 
characteristics,'' points along a particular ridge where something occurs: for 
example, a ridge might come to an end, a "ridge ending," or bifurcate into two 
ridges, a ''bifurcation."20 
It is commonly believed that an average human fingerprint contains 
between 75 and 175 ridge characteristics.21 But there is no standard agreement 
among fingerprint examiners as to either the precise number or nomenclature of 
the different characteristics. 22 Given the typically small size of latent prints, and 
given the amount of distortion that many latent prints suffer, fmgerprint examiners 
18 Ashbaugh, Qgantitati:oe-Qualitatwe Friction Rulge Ana[ysis, 117 ("Improper 
procedures, and especially efforts to correct those improper procedures, can cause 
various alterations in the lifted print."); ibid., 117-18 (describing incident where 
lifting tape caused alteration of several of the major ridge path deviations and error 
was only discovered because print had been photographed prior to lifting); Fine, 
"A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," 103 ("Each 
development medium can affect the appearance of a latent print and the accuracy 
with which the details are reproduced.''). 
19 Fine, "A Review of the FBl's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," 104. 
20 Ashbaugh, Quantitati:oe-Qgalitative Friction Rulge Ana[ysis, 141. 
21 Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Law Enforcement Bulletin: An. Analysis of 
Standards in Fingerprint Identification," June 1972, 1. 
22 James F. Cowger, Fricti.on Ridge Skin: Comparison and Identjfication of Fingerprints 
(Elsevier, 1983), 143 ("The terms used to define and describe these characteristics 
vary markedly among writers in the field and differ even among examiners 
depending upon the organization in which they were trained."). 
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often are in the position of making identifications on the basis of very limited 
information. 23 In many published decisions, for example, identifications were 
made on less than fifteen common ridge characteristics, even though as discussed 
above, a full fingerprint is thought to have between 75 and 200.24 
It has been well documented that different people can share a number of 
fingerprint ridge characteristics in common.25 There have been no scientific·studies 
performed that can reasonably serve to predict the probability of such events 
occurring. During the course of the past century, about a dozen or so fingerprint 
23 Fine, "A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," 99 ("In 
many latent prints, only a small fraction of the friction ridge detail on a complete 
finger is reproduced." 
24 United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1976) (fourteen points); Garrison 
v. Smith, 413 F. Supp. 747, 761 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (twelve points); Magwoodv. State, 
494 So.2d 124, 145 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (eleven points); R.amirez v. State, 542 
So.2d 352, 353 (Fla. 1989) (ten points); Peopk v. Al.exander, 571 N.E.2d 1075, 1078 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (eleven and fourteen points); Peopk v. Garlin, 428 N.E.2d 697, 
700 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (twelve points); State v. Murdock, 689 P.2d 814, 819 (Kan. 
1984) (twelve points); State v. Starks, 4 71 So.2d 1029, 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1985) 
(twelve points); Peopk v. Jones, 344 N.W.2d 46, 46 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (ten 
points); State v. Jones, 368 S.E.2d 844, 846 (N.C. 1988) (ten points); State v. Cepec, 
1991 WL 57237, at *l (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (eleven points); Commonwealthv. Ware, 
329 A.2d 258, 276 (Pa. 1974) (nine points); Commonwealth v. Hunter, 338 A.2d 623, 
624 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (fourteen points); Commonwealth v. Walker, 116 A.2d 230, 
234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955) (four points); State v. Awiis, 1999 WL 391372, at *7 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (eight points). 
25 Y. Mark & D. Attias, What Is the Minimum Stmuiard of Characteristi.csfor Fingerprint 
ldentificati.oni", 22 F'INGERPR. WHORID 148 (1996) (discussing prints from different 
people with substantial similarity and recognizing that "an expert with many years 
of experience behind him" could make a false identification when comparing two 
such prints); JAMES W. 0STERBURG, THE CRIME LABORATORY: CA.SE STUDIES 
OF SCIENTIFIC CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 132 {1968) (discussing fingerprints 
from different people with ten matching characteristics); Fine, "A Review of the 
FBl's Handling," at 130 (recognizing the substantial similarity between a 
fingerprint from Brandon Mayfield and a latent print deposited by another 
person). 
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probability models have been proposed. 26 "None of these [models] even 
approaches theoretical adequacy, however, and none has been subjected to 
empirical validations."27 Consequently, "these models occupy no role in the routine 
professional practice of fingerprint examination. "28 
Given the absence of probability studies, latent print examiners do not offer 
opinions of identification in terms of probability. Instead, latent print examiners 
make the claim of "absolute certainty" for their identifications. Examiners provide 
an opinion that the latent print at issue was made by a particular finger to the 
exclusion of all other fingerprints in the world.29 Such assertions of absolute 
certainty, however, are inherently unscientific. The National Academy of Sciences 
concluded that such opinions of absolute certainty by fingerprint examiners are 
plainly "unjustified."30 
Having conducted an exhaustive and unprecedented examination of the 
various forensic identification fields, including latent fingerprint analysis, the NAS 
concluded that fingerprint examiners "have yet to establish either the validity of 
26 David L Faigman, Modem Scimtifi,c Evulence: 17ze I.aw and Science of Expert Testimony 
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 2002), sec. 21-2.3.1, at 72; David A. Stoney and 
John I. Thornton, "A Critical Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint Individuality 
Models," Journal of Forensic Sciences 31, no. 4 (1986): 1193. 
27 Faigrnan, Modem Scimtifi,c Evi.dence, sec. 21-2.3.1, at 72. 
2B Ibid., sec. 21-2.3.1, at 72 (emphasis in original). 
29 Fine, "A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case," 111 
("FBI laboratory fingerprint examiners only express a conclusion of 
individualization in terms of absolute certainty with a zero likelihood that the 
latent fingerprint was made by a different person."). 
30 Strengthening Forensic Scimce, 142. 
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their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions. "31 In reaching these dramatic 
conclusions, the NAS specifically examined the standard ACE-V methodology 
employed by fingerprint examiners. As the NAS recognizes, ACE-V provides only 
a "broadly stated framework for conducing friction ridge analyses" and "is not 
specific enough to qualify as a validated method ... "32 The report provides 
ACE-V does not guard against bias; is too broad to ensure 
repeatability and transparency; and does not guarantee that two 
analysts following it will obtain the same results. For these reasons, 
merely following the steps of ACE-V does not imply that one is 
proceeding in a scientific manner or producing reliable results. A 
recent paper by Haber and Haber presents a thorough analysis of 
the ACE-V method and its scientific validity. Their conclusion is 
unambiguous: "We have reviewed available scientific evidence of the 
validity of the ACE-V method and found none. "33 
The NAS also considered the claim of fingerprint examiners that "the 
[ACE-VJ method, if followed correctly (i.e., by well-trained examiners properly 
using the method) has a zero error rate."34 In unambiguous language, the NAS 
dismisses this assertion: 
Clearly, this assertion is unrealistic, and moreover, it does not lead to 
a process of method improvement. The method, and the 
performance of those who use it, are inextricably linked, and both 
31 Strengthening Forensic Science, 53; see also ibid., 102 ("Over the years the courts have 
admitted fingerprint evidence, even though this evidence has made its way into the 
courtroom without empirical validation of the underlying theory and/ or its 
particular application."). 
32 Strengthening Forensic Science, 142. 
33 Ibid., 142-43; The NAS also notes that the "ACE-V method does not specify 
particular measurements or a standard test protocol, and examiners must make 
subjective assessments throughout." Ibid., 139. 
34 Strengthening Forensic Science, 143. 
19 
involve multiple sources of error (e.g., errors in executing the process 
steps, as well as errors in human judgment). 35 
The NAS also recognized that the fundamental issue in latent fingerprint 
analysis was not the uniqueness of each person's fingers, but the ability of 
examiners to accurately make identifications from the small, distorted fragments of 
fingerprints detected at crime scenes.36 As the NAS further explained, 
Uniqueness and persistence are necessary conditions for friction 
ridge identification to be feasible, but those conditions do not imply 
that anyone can reliably discern whether or not two friction ridge 
impressions were made by the same person. Uniqueness does not 
guarantee that prints from two different people are always 
sufficiently different that they cannot be confused, or that two 
impressions made by the same finger will also be sufficiently similar 
to be discerned as coming from the same source. The impression left 
by a given finger will differ every time, because of inevitable 
variations in pressure, which change the degree of contact between 
each part of the ridge structure and the impression medium. None of 
these variabilities--of features across a population of fingers or of 
repeated impressions left by the same finger--has been 
characterized, quantified, or compared. 37 
The NAS thus recognized that to "properly underpin the process of friction 
ridge identification, . . . research is needed into ridge flow and crease pattern 
distributions on the hands and feet . . . and the discriminating value of the various 
ridge formations and clusters of ridge formation"38 Contrasting fingerprint analysis 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 43 ("The question is less a matter of whether each person's fingerprints are 
permanent and unique - uniqueness is commonly assumed - and more a matter of 
whether one can determine with adequate reliability that the finger that left an 
imperfect impression at a crime scene is the same finger that left an impression 
[with different imperfections in a file of fingerprints."]. 
37 Ibid., 144. 
38 Ibid. 
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with DNA evidence, the NAS observed that "population statistics for fingerprints 
have not been developed, and friction ridge analysis relies on subjective judgments 
by the examiner."39 The NAS further recognized that, while "little research has 
been directed toward developing population statistics, . . . more would be 
feasible. "40 
Given the lack of research that has been conducted in the fingerprint field, 
the NAS explicitly stated that fingerprint examiners' routine claim-that they can 
match a latent print to the one and only person in the entire world who produced 
it--was "unjustified."41 As the NAS explained, 
At present, fingerprint examiners typically testify in the language of 
absolute certainty. Both the conceptual foundations and the 
professional norms of latent fingerprinting prohibit experts from 
testifying to identification unless they believe themselves certain that 
they have made a correct match. Experts therefore make the claim 
that they have matched the latent print to the one and only person in 
the entire world whose fingertip could have produced it ... Given the 
general lack of validity testing for fingerprinting; the relative dearth 
of difficult proficiency tests; the lack of a statistically valid model of 
fingerprinting; and the lack of validated standards for declaring a 
match, such claims of absolute, certain confidence in identification 
are unjustified.42 
Thus, as the NAS recognized, fingerprint analysis has not been "shown to have the 
capacity of consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a 
39 Ibid., 139. 
40 Ibid., 139-40. 
41 Ibid., 142; quoting Jennifer L. Mnookin, ''Validity of Latent Fingerprint 
Identification: The Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate," law, Prob. & Risk 7 
(2008): 127. 
42 Strengthening Forensic Science, 142. 
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connection between evidence [i.e, a latent print] and a specific individual or 
source. "43 
While defense counsel did not present this massive body of research to the 
court-nor did he challenge the fingerprint finding itself-he did alert the cow-t to 
this issue, observing that fingerprint evidence is not conclusive and that it lacked 
proper standards. R. 298. Therefore, the court could not take the fingerprint 
evidence as a given match to Mr. Cowlishaw. If anything, the court could have 
seen it as potential evidence linked to Mr. Cowlishaw, but not as proof. 
But even if the fingerprints belonged to Mr. Cowlishaw, they do not 
establish that he committed the crime. The fingerprints merely establish that he 
touched the car's window at some point and that a cup he touched was in the car. 
Absent evidence identifying him as the perpetrator, which never happened here, 
the fingerprints become meaningless. See discussion point I.B., infra. 
For these reasons, the State insufficiently proved that Mr. Cowlishaw 
committed any of these offenses because it failed to establish his identity. The court 
erred in failing to dismiss these charges. 
B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT MR. COWLISHAW 
COMMITTED A THEFT OF A VEfilCLE WHEN THE ONLY 
EVIDENCE TYING HIM: TO THE THEFT WERE ms 
FINGERPRINTS 
The State presented two pieces of evidence supporting a car theft. Mr. Saad 
testified that his car was taken while he went into his office. R. 230-31. He did not 
43 Ihi.d., 7. 
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see who took the car, however. R. 234. The only other evidence was Mr. 
Cowlishaw's fingerprints. R. 287-89. But those fingerprints do not establish that 
Mr. Cowlishaw took the vehicle. No witness testified as to how the car came into 
Mr. Cowlishaw's possession. 
If fingerprint evidence alone can be sufficient to convict one of a theft of a 
vehicle, then any innocent person could be convicted if she happens to merely 
touch a stolen vehicle. Instead, the State must produce some evidence to meet the 
elements of the offense. Here, the State must show that Mr. Cowlishaw had the 
"intent to deprive" Saad of his motor vehicle. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(defendant must have the "purpose to deprive" the owner of his property); Staie v. 
Comish, 568 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1977). 
This case is similar a case in which the Utah Supreme Court found 
insufficient evidence. In State v. Franks, the defendant was stopped for a traffic 
violation and subsequently arrested. State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982). 
When officers searched the impounded vehicle, they found title belonging to 
someone else. Id. Officers contacted the owners, who came and recovered their 
car. Id. The court found insufficient evidence to support the theft charge, since the 
State failed to prove that the defendant's use of the vehicle was not authorized. Id. 
Here, while Saad did not know Mr. Cowlishaw or allow him to take his car, 
there was no evidence that Mr. Cowlishaw in fact drove the vehicle, as discussed 
supra. But even more importantly, even had he done so, there is no evidence that 
Mr. Cowlishaw was the person who took the vehicle at the office. His prints could 
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have arrived there at any time after. For example, Jones could have taken the 
vehicle or anyone else for that matter. If that person represented to Mr. Cowlishaw 
that he could drive the vehicle, then Mr. Cowlishaw would have lacked the 
requisite intent-a purpose to deprive the owner of the vehicle. Critically, the 
fingerprint evidence says absolutely nothing about intent. See Stat,e v. Morrell, 89 
Utah 498, 118 P. 215 ( 1911) (insufficient evidence for a theft where defendant 
lacked the intent to take property). 
Nor did the State present any evidence that Mr. Cowlishaw stole the car. 
The only evidence they presented was a statement of Mr. Cowlishaw's that "I've 
been stealing vehicles since I was 17." R. 208. But this statement came when the 
officer said Mr. Cowlishaw was "extremely high" "just saying crazy off the wall 
things," such as that the officer was "being controlled by the government with 
microchips and radiation." R. 208. This statement does not qualify as an 
admission that Mr. Cowlishaw took a vehicle. 
This case nearly mirrors one in which the Utah Supreme Court found 
insufficient evidence. In that case, a truck with a camper disappeared from a used 
car lot. Stat,e v. George, 25 Utah 2d 330, 331, 481 P.2d 667, 667 (1971 ). About a 
week later, two witnesses testified that the defendants brought the camper to their 
place and that they found a buyer for it. Id. 
"There was no evidence," the court said, "as to whether the defendants or 
either of them or neither of them took the truck and camper, save by way of 
inference from their presence when the camper was left and sold ... " Id. The court 
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was left to "indulge an inference upon an inference that could lead but to 
conjecture not justifying a conclusion that a theft was accomplished by both or 
either of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of any 
reasonable hypothesis other than theft." Id. Consequently, it reversed the 
conviction. 
Similarly, Mr. Cowlishaw's print was found on the vehicle, but there was no 
testimony establishing that he took the car other than an "inference upon an 
inference that could lead but to conjecture ... " Id. The court had to infer that 
because Mr. Cowlishaw's print was on the vehicle, he must have been driving it. 
From there, it would have to inf er that because he was driving, he must have taken 
the vehicle from Saad. From there, it had to inf er that he had the intent to steal the 
vehicle. One's fingerprints are simply not enough to make the repeated inferential 
chain. 
Finally, the State never linked the two automobiles together. "[I] t is clear 
that the State must definitely identify the goods found in the defendant's possession 
as the goods which were charged to have been stolen before the jury may draw an 
inference of guilt based upon the proof of possession by the defendant." Stat,e v. 
Hall, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494, 496 (1944). Saad testified that he owned a "sky 
blue" Nissan Versa and one officer said the car was blue. R. 148, 230. Yet Saad 
never identified the crashed vehicle as his and three witnesses testified that the car 
was silver or grey in color. R. 147, 196, 197-98, 212,223, 241, 243. 
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The problem could have been fixed by simply asking Mr. Saad if the 
recovered vehicle was in fact his. But the State would also have to correct the 
inf er en ti.al chain by having Jones and officers identify the crashed vehicle as the 
one she rode in and/ or the one they chased. But the State failed to take those 
steps, and absent that effort, the court lacked sufficient evidence to convict Mr. 
Cowlishaw of theft of a motor vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
The court erred in convicting Mr. Cowlishaw when there were two 
insufficiencies. First, there was no evidence that Mr. Cowlishaw was the person 
who committed kidnapping or failing to respond to the police since no witness 
identified him. Second, there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Cowlishaw 
committed a theft of a vehicle when none of the evidence established that he 
illegally took the car with the intent to steal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18 day of November, 2016. 
/ s/ Samuel P. Newton 
SAMUEL P. NEWTON 
Attorney for the Defendant/ Appellant 
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Tab A 
ADDENDUMA 
Constitutional Provisions 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
FIFrH AMENDMENT 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defen(s)e. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTION 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7. [DUE PROCESS OF LAW.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process oflaw. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. [RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and def end in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify 
in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
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ADDENDUMB 
Statutory Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-6-404. Theft -- Elements. 
A person commits theft ifhe obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereo£ 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence. 
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a 
defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged. 
UtahR. Crim. P. 17(p) 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all 
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally 
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
Tab C 
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ADDENDUMC 
Motion £or Directed Verdict 
1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 CLOSING ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL 
3 MR. TREE: Your Honor, you've received the evidence in 
4 this case. We have charged the defendant with three different 
5 charges. The first charge is that of kidnaping. We're going 
6 forward on two different theories, both of which the evidence 
7 today supports both of those theories. 
8 The first theory is that the defendant intentionally, 
9 knowingly without authority of the law detained or restrained the 
10 victim in this case, Rachel Jones, for any substantial period of 
11 time. In this case, the testimony was that at least beginning in 
12 Clinton and possibly even before, the defendant was restraining 
13 her, detaining her, driving her around against her will. She 
14 asked him to take her home several times. He had her phone as a 
15 means to keep her with him. He made several promises to take her 
16 home, but he continued against her will to drive throughout Davis 
17 and Weber County, driving as she put it, very dangerously. 
18 From -- she goes with him around 4:30 to 5, and she shows up at 
19 the toll booth at 10:30. 
20 The second theory is that he detained or restrained her 
21 in circumstances exposing her to risk of bodily injury. That 
22 also -- the State has provided evidence to support that theory. 
23 Specifically -- as your Honor is well aware, that bodily injury 
24 is -- the definition of bodily injury is very slight physical 
25 injury. It doesn't require serious bodily injury or death; but 
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certainly the ride just -- if we just look at nothing else but 
the toll booth and the evading chase that he took Rachel on, that 
in and of itself would satisfy the kidnaping under that theory. 
I'll just play this for just a moment, your Honor. 
(Video plays in open court) 
If you remember, your Honor, at this point the defendant 
says that he's not going to let this happen, this can't happen 
and begins going at a high rate of speed down Adams Parkway. The 
lights, the siren -- the lights at this point are going 10:30 at 
night, 10:50. There's a construction area before the hospital. 
Here come the siren on. 
You can see the increase -- obvious increase in speed by 
the defendant and by Deputy Green, flipping through these cones 
are the first traffic light, and then the most -- the dangerous 
one on 89. As you can see the speed of Deputy Green got to 
almost 85 there following him, red light. We heard the testimony 
of Rachel that they were nearly hit in that intersection. Then 
the defendant willfully or wantonly continues down the dead end 
road, through the field and down the steep embankment. 
This from the toll both to the steep embankment 
alone, the Court has been provided with enough facts that the 
defendant had detained or restrained the victim in circumstances, 
exposing her to risk of bodily injury. Add to the fact his 
driving pattern, his the donuts, the dangerous driving that he 
had been doing prior to that starting in Clinton, and that the 
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State has certainly met that on many different counts, has met 
the burden on kidnaping under that theory. But under both 
theories the Court could find -- should find the defendant is 
guilty of kidnaping. 
The second charge that the Court -- the State has filed 
is evading or failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop. 
Obviously we just watched State's Exhibit -- I believe it was No. 
32 where Deputy Green made both an audio and visual signal to the 
defendant to stop, and he refused to stop. He certainly did so 
in a willful or wanton manner, and the other theory is he was 
attempting to avoid law enforcement. 
Finally, your Honor, the third charge that the State has 
charged the defendant with is theft. When the defendant we 
look at one of the most important pieces of evidence on on the 
theft is Exhibit 24. You had testimony from the victim in this 
case that his vehicle was stolen sometime from 3:30 to 4. You 
had further testimony from Detective Colvin that the dispatch 
report actually shows it was closer to 4:30. 
From the Bimbo Bakery, which is marked in State's 
Exhibit 24, to just a little under a mile away from where Rachel 
was at when the defendant took her for the ride of her life, she 
said they left sometime between 4:30, 5. Certainly the defendant 
going -- taking the vehicle, going and picking her up indicates 
that he was the person that stole the motor vehicle. 
Then later on his actions, his fleeing from the police 
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1 go -- only support and confirm that he was the one -- he knew 
2 that the vehicle was stolen, that he had obtained unauthorized 
3 control of the vehicle, and that he was trying to avoid detection 
4 during that ride with Rachel. 
5 Then finally, your Honor, one thing that had been raised 
6 by the defense is the identify of the defendant. I think that 
7 the State has provided the Court with ample evidence to support 
8 that the defendant was in fact the person that committed these 
9 offenses. The victim talked to the Court about her knowledge, 
10 her acquaintance with the defendant. She ID'd him in court, and 
11 then we have the fingerprint mat comparison, which indicated 
12 the defendant was the individual in the vehicle at the time this 
13 was all taking place. Taking all the evidence together, your 
14 Honor, the State has met its burden on all three counts. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Thanks, Mr. Tree. Mr. Bushell? 
16 MR. BUSHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Judge, I too, have 
17 two distinct theories. May I turn this just a little bit? 
18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 MR. BUSHELL: I don't want to (inaudible). 
20 THE COURT: Yeah, no problem. ~ 
21 MR. BUSHELL: It's easier for me if I (inaudible) like 
22 this. 
23 THE COURT: That's fine. 
24 MR. BUSHELL: I have also two distinct theories about 
25 this case, maybe two separate defenses, and there are two that I 
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would like to present to the Court for its consideration today. 
The first is the defense of that this individual who sits before 
you today was not involved in this case at all, the reason being 
is that the evidence today simply didn't bear that out. 
No one actually identified my client today. Rachel was 
not asked to point out and identify Preston Cowlishaw as the 
individual she was with. I specifically noted that, because 
that's a typical tactic that defense -- I'm sorry, the 
prosecutors to use to say is this the individual in the courtroom 
today, where is he, then asks your Honor to take note on whether 
or not that happened. I wrote down that that was not done·for 
Rachel or for Sharon, the toll booth operator today, who had the 
best opportunity to see my client, and neither was asked 
specifically if this individual sitting here is the individual 
involved in this case. 
Deputy Green did not see. He testified that it was too 
dark, and he couldn't even tell how many occupants were in the 
vehicle as it was racing up Adams Avenue. The individual who 
owned the vehicle, Mr. Saad, did not see or even know my client. 
Deputy Aschinger did not see either. 
While there is some question about the fingerprints that 
were found, fingerprint evidence is not 100 percent conclusive. 
There is no real industry standard of how many marks -- let me 
get the correct phraseology that was used here -- similarities or 
points of comparison. Our CSI agent just testified if she gets 
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over 10, that's usually good enough. That's not 100 percent 
conclusive that that was his. It could have been somebody 
else's. 
One thing that I hit on early on was the scratches. 
In the exhibits that the State provided there were two small 
scratches that looked like they had been scabbed over, and to 
me -- I'm not a scientist, I'm not a doctor -- looked like they 
were older type of scratches, not freshly consistent with running 
through thick scrub brush in the middle of the night, dark, 
without a flashlight, going through that -- that area, which was 
described as steep, almost straight down. There were cactus 
around. You would think that someone running away from cops with 
two dogs would just race through this type of foliage and be 
scratched up a lot worse than what happened. 
One also final piece of evidence that was brought to our 
attention today was that Rachel had no idea who the last name of 
this individual was initially. She had two or three different 
opportunities to provide that to the officers and never did. In 
fact, the individual who gave it to the officers wasn't even here 
to testify today. 
So our first argument is, your Honor, is that this 
incident that occurred did not involve my client whatsoever. Now 
the second theory is one where I place my client in a situation 
where his guilt would be, I think, proven in Counts II and III of 
the Information. The reason I'm doing this, your Honor, is 
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1 because I believe that Count I, the kidnaping, is a more serious 
2 of the three charges. As my calling allows to do what's best for 
3 my client, there is another theory here that I think makes a lot 
4 of sense as well for your Honor to consider. 
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That is that Rachel and Preston knew each other, that a 
car was taken. You look how close the proximity was, it makes 
sense. Preston and Rachel decided to go out that evening, in 
this stolen vehicle, and they went out for the sole purpose of 
using drugs. 
The reason I made such a big deal of trying to get in 
and eventually getting in what Rachel was ultimately booked into 
jail for was for warrants -- outstanding warrants for 
paraphernalia and for possession or use of a controlled 
substance. 
Your Honor, the indi -- the exhibits that were presented 
to us today by the State, specifically Exhibits 15, 16 -- I think 
it was 15 and 16 -- show a vehicle that was not at all described 
by Mr. Saad. These pictures look like you would see in cars that 
19 people are living in, that are using in. Garbage strewn 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
everywhere. 
My theory of this case is, your Honor, is that Rachel 
and Preston went out, started using and drove around. If you 
take what they're saying as truth, Rachel got picked up around 
4:30, 5 o'clock. They drove around for six hours almost, and 
only made one stop early on to get a pie and a cup of water. 
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Mr. Saad testified that this garbage in his vehicle was 
not there when it was stolen, so obviously there were some stops 
made. There are Gatorade cups in here, there are plastic bags. 
There's a nut bag. There's Powerade. There's just a lot of 
garbage, consistent with making multiple stops. 
Rachel had numerous chances to leave. I think there 
were more than the two stops she talks about, the one at the 
church and the one at the toll booth. I think the garbage in the 
car proves that, that there were chances to get out. What I 
think happened here is these individuals were using. They were 
using pretty heavily. They were driving around. They get 
hungry, they got thirsty, they stopped. 
We didn't get into it a whole lot, but there was a phone 
call made. Rachel had a chance to call her mom. There was a 
text made. The officer testified he read that text, and that 
looked like a text to come in and either sell some drugs or buy 
some drugs. 
This is a hard argument for me to make, your Honor, 
because it does place my client directly in a stolen vehicle, and 
it places him at the scene of the crash, but it doesn't give rise 
to the kidnaping charge, which is the more serious of all of 
these charges, because at this point, under our theory, Preston 
Cowlishaw did not knowingly or intentionally or without authority 
of law and against the will of the victim, Rachel Jones, detain 
or restrain her for a substantial period. She voluntarily went 
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along. She voluntarily got back in the car -- if you take her 
word for it 
--
twice, but I think Exhibits 15 and 16 show that 
there had to have been more than two stops. There had to be 
ample opportunity to go into a store and buy these items. 
Or under subsection (b) of that, detain or restrain the 
victim in circumstances exposing the victim to risk of bodily 
injury. Two individuals out on a drug binge. She was there on 
her own accord, and while he was driving, my guess is 
intoxicated, the use of drugs. It doesn't put her in that 
situation where she falls under the level of a kidnaping. 
This was a voluntary joy ride these individuals went on 
to go out and to use narcotics, and as Mr. Tree indicated on that 
vehicle where he's driving away and saying this isn't going to 
happen, that makes sense for two individuals who are using drugs, 
driving around in a vehicle for six plus hours to want to try and 
get away. That's our theory of the case, your Honor. If the 
Court is not agreeable to the first theory, I would ask the Court 
to consider strongly the second theory in that my client is not 
guilty of at least Count I of that Information, the kidnaping. 
THE COURT: All right. Thanks, Mr. Bushell. Mr. Tree? 
MR. TREE: Thank you, your Honor. Your Honor, the 
necessity to have a formal identification as 
--
the Courts have 
talked about that when you talk about the individual, when you 
speak to the witness as the defendant, as she mentioned him as 
Preston several times, that formal identification by the witness 
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is not necessary. Obviously in court she nodded towards the 
defendant. She used his name. We used the name defendant 
several different times. If that formal identification wasn't 
made, it was certainly made throughout her testimony as she 
described what the defendant did to her. 
Additionally, Officer Green formally identified the 
defendant as Preston Cowlishaw as the same individual they used 
the fingerprints for, and that necessity that Mr. Bushell claims 
that we have to do the formal identification is not necessary and 
was not necessary in this case, given the totality of what 
happened during the testimony of Ms. Jones. 
Second, looking at the theory of the case that because 
there's a lot of garbage in the vehicle, these two did drugs for 
this entire time, there's no evidence of drug use found, no 
evidence of needles, drugs in the vehicle at all. That cer 
his theory certainly isn't supported. Those kinds of things --
you would see paraphernalia, you would see those things. The 
most -- the worst item that was found in the vehicle was 
cigarettes. Certainly nothing that would indicate that this was 
a drug binge gone wrong. 
Mr. Bushell talked about the victim's chances to leave. 
I think she adequately explained why she kept going back with the 
defendant, hoping, believing when he said, "Okay, I'll take you 
home," that he would in fact take her home. She was -- it was a 
very surreal experience for her. She had a hard time believing 
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that he wasn't going to take her home, that he was going to keep 
her and drive around with her for -- until something like this 
apparently happened. 
As the State explained, even if you were to take 
Mr. Bushell's theory at face value that she was knowingly with 
him, certainly at the time they got to the toll booth, that 
theory goes down the drain. The second that vehicle stopped you 
saw that door open, you saw her go into the office. You saw the 
look on her face. You saw her looking around, looking for help. 
She ends up back in the car, but even though she ended up back in 
the car, that ride during the evading was against her will. She 
asked him several times to stop. 
He did detain or restrain her in circumstances, exposing 
her to risk of bodily injury, going at the speeds he went through 
that narrow construction zone, through the stop lights and 
through 89, and then darting over the embankment at the end of 
the road. All of those things are indicative of that the 
defendant did kidnap her under the definition provided under the 
law. 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Thank you, Mr. Tree. 
All right. I appreciate the arguments and the evidence. I think 
I'm ready to rule on the case, though. I was thinking about 
taking it under advisement. I think after hearing the testimony 
and the arguments, I'm prepared to deal with the case. 
Let me deal with them in reverse order, because I do 
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1 agree with Mr. Bushell. I think the real tough issue here is the 
2 kidnaping charge. One Count III, the theft, there's no question 
3 that Mr. Saad discovered that somebody had taken his car. It 
4 took place -- he noticed it sometime around 3:30 or 4 or 4:30 in 
5 the afternoon. He reported it. 
6 There's no question that we've got -- his motor vehicle 
7 was stolen, and as -- I think the defense raises an interesting 
8 argument that Mr. Saad had never identified the car that we see 
9 in the photographs 15, 16 and 17 as being his car. While that's 
10 true, I mean I -- it's -- you look not only at direct evidence, 
11 but circumstantial. To me, the compelling evidence that the car 
12 that the police recovered here up in Ogden is the same car is the 
13 fact that Mr. Saad was called and said, •we found your car. It's 
14 up here in Ogden," and he came up and looked at it, and of course 
15 he said he was completely totaled, which is consistent with the 
16 condition of the car that we have in the photographs, Exhibits 
17 15, 16 and 17. 
18 So while he may not have identified the photographs, I 
19 think based on the totality of the evidence, there's no question 
20 that the car that's recovered here in Ogden is the one that 
21 Mr. Saad reported as being missing. So as I recall, he was 
22 shown some of the photographs, and that he never made a clear 
23 identification, but I -- but I'm just convinced that we're 
24 talking about his vehicle being the one that was recovered that 
25 had been totaled. So I think it's the same car, regardless of 
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that fact. So no question that the car that we're talking about 
is the one that belonged, at least in my mind, to Mr. Saad. 
What ties the defendant into this, of course, is the 
fingerprints. As I recall, there were three different 
fingerprints, two on the window on the driver's side, and then 
one on the cup that's near the console inside. The testimony of 
Ms. McKenzie as a CSI is that she's -- it was her opinion that 
these fingerprints belong to the defendant. So I don't think 
there's any question that the defendant was the one involved in 
the theft of this motor vehicle based on the location of the 
fingerprints. 
The other argument that the victim has never identified 
him here in the courtroom, again, while she may not have come out 
and made an identification, she said the man that was driving the 
car was Preston. Well, it just so happens that the defendant's 
first name is Preston. So while she may not have pointed to him 
and made a formal identification in court, I think when you 
couple the fingerprints and both of them being in the car, and 
him having the name Preston, I think that's enough to establish 
the identification. So I don't think there's any question that 
the State has proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt on Count 
III, the theft charge. 
The same is pretty much true on the failure to respond 
to a police officer's signal. All you have to do is look at the 
video, the dash cam video. There's no question that on June 24 th 
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somebody was operating the vehicle. They received a visual or 
audible signal from a peace officer to bring the vehicle to a 
stop. There's no question that based on what I saw that it was 
clearly a willful or wanton disregard of the signal, running stop 
signs, running red lights. There's no question that this 
conduct, this action endangered the operation of the vehicle or 
person, and it was an attempt to flee or allude. Again, what 
ties the defendant into this criminal conduct is the 
fingerprints, and also I think the testimony of Ms. Jones. 
It is a difficult call on Count I, at least raises some 
concern on the kidnaping charge, but here's here's what I --
what I believe from the evidence that I've heard, is first of 
all, you have the testimony of Ms. Jones. She testified that she 
knew the defendant, Preston. She didn't know him real well. She 
had met him a couple of times. He wasn't a stranger, and I don't 
think there's any question that initially she got in that car 
voluntarily. If that had been the situation all the way through 
because they were just going for a ride, then I would find the 
defendant not guilty. 
But according to her testimony, something changed. 
Something happened in the course of that period of time from 3:30 
or 4 until about 11 o'clock at night. She said at one point he 
took her cell phone and said it was a distraction, that she 
wasn't focused. She said, "I became afraid. I was concerned.n 
There was just something bizarre about Preston, his behavior. I 
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don't know what caused that. I don't have any evidence that it 
was drugs or it wasn't drugs. I don't -- alcohol was involved. 
I have no idea, because there isn't any evidence, but Ms. Jones 
just said his behavior was strange and bizarre. That may not 
have been her words, but that was the conclusion I reached is 
that somehow his behavior become different as the night wore on. 
So he takes her phone away. She said his driving was 
reckless, the way he was driving was strange. She said, "I 
became concerned for my own safety." She tried to call home at 
one time, nobody answered. 
Then I -- we have the testimony, and nobody really 
talked about it. I thought one of the officers said that he 
looked at her cell phone, and that there was this message on the 
cell phone that said, "Help, I'm being kidnaped or I'm being 
held," or something like that, which I thought that was pretty 
significant that there's a message. Maybe I got it wrong, but I 
thought the officer testified that he looked at her cell phone 
and there was this message about, "Help, I've been kidnaped," on 
her cell phone. 
I thought that was a pretty significant piece of 
evidence, because it goes to her state of mind at the time of the 
incident. She told him several times she wanted to go home. He 
didn't follow those requests or instructions, and continued to go 
from Salt Lake all the way up here to Ogden. 
So you have the testimony of Ms. Jones, but it's not 
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just her testimony that I thought was critical. I thought the 
key to the kidnaping came from the testimony of the lady who ran 
the toll booth, because her testimony to a large extent 
corroborates what Ms. Jones said. I know the defense feels like 
the -- I don't know, maybe she was on drugs or alcohol. She said 
she wasn't, but I don't even need to get there because I've got 
the testimony of the toll booth operator, and she said, "Yeah, 
I -- they pulled up to the toll booth, and this young girl jumps 
out on the passenger side and runs into the office," and she 
said, "It was strange. I didn't know what I had in front of me 
here." 
The other thing she said there -- as I noticed the girl, 
she said, "There was something about her body language." I know 
we've all seen it in different incidents. It's not what you say, 
it's how you react. She said that when she looked at her, she 
said, "I could see fear. I could see fear, and I knew that 
something was wrong." She said, "I became very distressed or 
very concerned." She said, "What I saw in front of me was a 
distressed girl." Again, I think that goes back to the body 
language. 
Anyway, the toll booth lady, you've got to give her 
credit. I mean she calls 911. There was something unusual going 
on here, and she couldn't put her finger on it, but it was just 
so bizarre, so strange. So she calls 911, and then the police 
arrive, and we've got the high speed chase and the crash. They 
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find the victim, and I think the officer said that she seemed to 
me Ms. Jones seemed to be very upset. So -- and I don't think 
it was just over the crash. It was over the whole episode or the 
entire incident. 
So anyway, based on that evidence, I am convinced that 
the State has met the burden of proof on the kidnaping charge. 
So in summary, the Court will find the defendant, Mr. Cowlishaw, 
guilty on all three counts. I'll find that the State has met the 
burden of proof in this case beyond a reasonable doubt. 
All right. Do we need -- anything else that I need to 
address? 
MR. BUSHELL: Maybe just a sentencing date on these, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: I was just going to get to that, and I just 
didn't know if I hadn't met -- or had to deal with any other 
issues. 
MR. BUSHELL: No. 
THE COURT: So --
MR. BUSHELL: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's -- what are we looking at, 
Monica, about 45 days for 
COURT CLERK: We either have the May 25~ date or 
(inaudible) June 1". 
MR. BUSHELL: June 1 st is the start of that drug court 
conference. I'll be gone. 
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